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HOME OFFICE DEDUCTIONS UNDER THE NEW SECTION
280A OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
EDWARD J. DE GUARDIOLA

The deductions attributable to expenses incurred for partial business use or income producing use of a taxpayer's personal residence
have been the subject of substantial litigation over the past decade.
The causes of this controversy are several and can he traced back
to the early 1960's. Since that time, taxpayers seeking to utilize
these deductions have found themselves in the middle of a struggle
between the Internal Revenue Service and the courts as each developed conflicting tests to determine the boundaries of the home office
deduction.
As a result of the confusion and controversy, the need arose for
definitive rules to resolve the conflict. Congress, although silent and
inactive on this issue in the past, was clearly the best suited for final
arbitration. In late 1976 it responded by promulgating the new section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code.' This section carves out the
general rule that no deduction will be allowed for expenses arising
from business use of a dwelling in which the individual taxpayer
resides.' The section then sets out limited exceptions.3 The Code
now prescribes a formula which limits the maximum deduction allowable, 4 and establishes an additional requirement for the employee who seeks a home office deduction.' The new section also
permits a deduction under certain circumstances when a portion of
the taxpayer's residence is used as storage for his trade inventory.'
Other provisions in section 280A limit deductible expenses from
rental of vacation homes;7 they will not be discussed in this note.
This note will explore the requirements and ramifications of section 280A which directly relate to the home office deduction. It will
also discuss how the new section resolves the prevalent areas of
dispute between the Tax Court and the Internal Revenue Service.
However, for a full understanding of the problems involved in the
home office area, some historical grounding is necessary.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 601, 90 Stat. 1569.
I.R.C. § 280A (a).
Id. § 280A (c) (1).
Id. § 280A (c) (5).
Id. § 280A (c) (1).
Id. § 280A (c) (2).
Id. § 280A (d)-(g).

130

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:129

BACKGROUND

The deductibility of a home office expense prior to the passage of
section 280A was governed by several provisions in the Internal
Revenue Code. A deduction was allowed for all the "ordinary and
necessary" expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business.' In addition, a depreciation deduction was allowed for property
used in a trade or business.' A taxpayer unable to meet the section
162 criteria could qualify for a deduction under section 212 if the
expense was incurred for the production of income." °
The primary restrictions on the above provisions were sections 262
and 263 which rendered all personal and capital expenses nondeductible unless specifically allowed in the Code." Accordingly, the ultimate question in each case became whether the use of a protion of
one's home for work was a trade or business use, a profit-seeking use,
or a nondeductible personal use.
162 DEDUCTIONS
The key to section 162 deductions turns on the interpretation of
the phrase "ordinary and necessary." In 1933 the Supreme Court in
Welch v. Helvering" construed the words "necessary" as imposing
only the minimal requirement that the expenditure be "appropriate
and helpful" for the development of the taxpayer's business, and
SECTION

8. I.R.C. § 162. The relevant portions of section 162 provide:
(a) In General-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging
other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property
to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has
no equity.
9. I.R.C. § 167.
10. Section 212 provides:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for
the production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.
11. I.R.C. §§ 262, 263. See also Tress. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3) (1959), which treats all expenses of maintaining a household as non-deductible unless the taxpayer "uses part of the house
as his place of business."
12. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
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"ordinary" to mean that the expense be noncapital and consistent
with normal business practices. "Ordinary" was later redefined by
the Court in Commissioner v. Tellier,'3 to require that the expense
be merely noncapital.' 4 Thus, after Tellier, the test for a section 162
deduction was whether a noncapital expense was "appropriate and
helpful" to the taxpayer's business. One who sought a deduction for
home office expenses would have to demonstrate that the office at
home was an ordinary and necessary business expense within the
meaning of section 162.
Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Service began to implement
guidelines governing home office expenses which were inconsistent
with the developing judicial attitude. The conflicting approaches of
the judiciary and the)Service regarding home office deductions precipitated the substantial litigation of the 1960's. One of the early
confrontations was Harold H. Davis.5 In Davis a college professor
built a study over his garage to do research. The Tax Court held that
Davis was not entitled to a deduction for depreciation and the expenses of maintaining an office at his residence. The decision rested
on the fact that the room was for the taxpayer's personal convenience and that he was not required by the college to maintain a home
office.'"
The test articulated by the Tax Court in Davis was soon restated
by the Service. Revenue Ruling 62-180 took a tough stand on employee home offices, stating:
The burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish (1) that,
as a condition of his employment, he is required to provide his own
space and facilities for performance of some of his duties, (2) that
he regularly uses a part of his personal residence for that purpose,
13. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
14. Id. at 689-90. In Tellier the Court allowed as a business deduction the expenses
incurred by the taxpayer in the unsuccessful legal defense of a criminal action. Its rationale
is expressed in the following:
The principal function of the term "ordinary" in § 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and those
that are in the nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must be
amortized over the useful life of the asset.

Id.
15. 38 T.C. 175 (1962).
16. Id. at 179-80. The decision in Davis evoked a strong dissent from Judge Raum, in
which three other judges concurred. Stressing that the statute was misconstrued by the
majority, Raum alternatively proposed that the proper test was not whether the home office
was required by the employer but whether it was appropriate, helpful, and proximately
related to the taxpayer's business. Id. at 186-87. The Service, perhaps concerned with Raum's
clairvoyant dissent, mysteriously vacated the appeal before a decision was handed down.
[19641 6 FED. TAXEs (P-H) 56, 343.
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(3) the portion of his personal residence which is so used, (4) the
extent of such use, and (5) the pro rata portion of the depreciation
and expenses for maintaining his residence which is properly attributable to such use.
The deductible expenses of an employee, whose conditions of
employment are such that he regularly uses a part of his residence
in the performance of his duties as an employee, include a pro rata
portion of such items as rent, light, taxes, and interest on a mortgage. No portion of purely personal expenses attributable to family
household purposes are deductible. 7
Revenue Ruling 62-180 was significant in two respects. First, the
taxpayer was forced to demonstrate that as a condition of his employment he was required to maintain a home office. This strict
requirement effectively excluded a significant number of employees
who failed to show that they were required to do work outside of
their business office because of their position or employment agreement. Second, the Ruling provided for the deduction of an allocable
portion of the ordinary and necessary expenses. This portion was
computed by multiplying two separate fractions: first, the ratio of
the room(s) used to total rooms (a percentage usually determined
in terms of total square feet); and second, where a portion of the
residence was used for business purposes only part of the time, a
further allocation was made-the ratio of the time the area was
actually used for business purposes to the total time it was available
for all uses. 8 Whatever its motivation for issuing Revenue Ruling
62-180, the Service had in effect conceded that a taxpayer could
obtain a deduction for maintaining a home office. Remaining to be
resolved were the enforceability of the condition of employment
requirement and the proper method of allocating the allowable deduction.
THE

Newi DECISION AND ITS PROGENY

In 1969 the Tax Court was once again faced with a taxpayer who
used part of his residence as an office even though adequate working
17. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52, 53.
18. Id. at 54, 56-57. The effect of the formula was substantially to decrease a taxpayer's
deduction. For example, assume an employee maintained a home office and used it on the
average of three hours per day. If the room used for the office equaled one-sixth of the total
square footage of the home, then only 3/24 x 1/6 = 1/48 of the deductible expenses would be
allowed The arithmetic result for a taxpayer with rent and utility bills of $480 per month
would be a deduction of $10 per month.
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facilities were provided by the employer.'" George Newi was employed by the American Broadcasting Company to sell advertising
time on television. He used a study in his home three or four hours
each night to review the day's selling activities, to conduct research,
to plan the next day's work, and to view television advertisements.
The taxpayer's office at work was available to him at night, and TV
equipment was also readily available. 20 The Tax Court allowed a
deduction and, in so doing, boldly pronounced a new standard for
determining whether home office expenses were ordinary and necessary under section 162.
The Service had vigorously argued that the expenses were not
ordinary and necessary within the meaning of section 162 because
the employee was not required to provide office space and the American Broadcasting Company had readily available space.2 1 The Tax
Court disagreed with the Commissioner's interpretation of
"ordinary and necessary" and held that the word "necessary" imposed only the minimal requirement that the expenditure be
"appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business. 2 Moreover,
the court stated that it was unaware of any legal requirement that
the expenditure be "required" before becoming an allowable busi23
ness deduction.
The Commissioner appealed the Tax Court's construction of the
phrase "ordinary and necessary" to the Second Circuit.2 4 He argued
that the "appropriate and helpful" test 'would open the doors for
a business deduction to any employee who would voluntarily choose
to engage in an activity at home which conceivably could be helpful
to his employer's business. '25 Unpersuaded by this argument, the
court replied:
The Commissioner need have no such concern. This case opens the
doors just long enough to enable this taxpayer to pass through it
into his cloistered study to pursue his business. It is his business
to sell television programs in a competitive market. To do this he
must endeavor to secure the maximum amount of television infor19. George H. Newi, 38 T.C.M. (P-H) 735 (1969).
20. Id. at 737.
21. Id. at 740.
22. Id., citing Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966); Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
23. Id., citing Commissioner v. Pacific Mills, 207 F.2d 177, 180 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'g 17
T.C. 705 (1951); Waring Products Corp., 27 T.C. 921, 929 (1957).
24. Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970).
25. Id. at 1000.
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mation available. It would be hard to imagine a better method
than, in the isolation of his study-den, to view, ponder over and
make notes relating to television programs."6
Of particular interest and importance in the court's opinion is the
weight given to the convenience factor. The court said it would have
been impractical for the taxpayer to travel back to his office from
his residence. It reasoned that the difficulty in traveling in New
York City at the theatre hour would have wasted valuable time and
caused Newi to miss many of the programs which would have been
of importance to him."
Newi's liberalization of the home office deduction increased the
field of employee deductions. Treating the benefit to the employer
and the adequacy of available office space tests as irrelevant, the
court clearly initiated a major shift in the interpretation of federal
tax laws by focusing on the employee's business needs rather than
those of the employer. 8 Consider though, the ramifications of Newi
for the Internal Revenue Service.
As mentioned previously, the Service's concern with potential
taxpayer abuse in the area of home office deduction was likely an
important consideration prior to the issuance of Revenue Ruling 62180. The condition of employment requirement gave the Service
solid ground to stand upon in determining the legality of the deductions. After Newi, however, the Service was faced with the difficult
task of disallowing deductions for expenses incurred by an employee
in the privacy of his home. Once an employee testified that the
office was used for business purposes, then the heavy burden of
proving that the office was not "appropriate and helpful" to the
employer would shift to the Service. Thus Newi left only one of the
three requirements of Revenue Ruling 62-180 to be met. A taxpayer
merely had to demonstrate that he used his residence "regularly"
to perform his duties as an employee.
In Stephen A. Bodzin, 9 the Tax Court seemed to further expand
the permissible limits of the home office deduction. The taxpayer,
an Internal Revenue Service attorney employed in the Interpretative Division, used a portion of his residence to complete assigned
work and "to read widely about current developments in the tax
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. This attitude was reflected in Marvin L. Dietrich, 40 T.C.M. (P-H) 715 (1971), affl'd,
503 F.2d 1379 (8th Cir. 1974), wherein the court stated that there is no reason "for imposing
a stricter standard upon taxpayers whose trade or business is that of an employee." Id. at
717.
29. 60 T.C. 820 (1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
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law. '3 Although "not required, requested, expected, or encouraged
to work after normal working hours," the attorney frequently took
work home with him to "meet deadlines, self-imposed or otherwise,
'31
and to insure that work was performed to the best of his abilities.
Despite the fact that the taxpayer's office at work was available to
him at all times, the Tax Court held that maintenance of the home
office was "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's conduct of
business and thus deductible under section 162.32 In so doing, the
court rejected the Service's attempt to reinterpret Revenue Ruling
62-180. The Commissioner argued that "the examples set forth in
Rev[enue] Rul[ing] 62-180 . . . made it clear that the term
'required as a condition of employment' means required in order to
properly perform the employment duties. ' 33 The court criticized
this construction of the word "required," stating that it was too
limiting and overly strict, and instead held:
The applicable test for judging the deductibility of home office
expenses is whether, like any other business expense, the maintenance of an office in the home is appropriate and helpful under all
the circumstances .... That the maintenance of the home office
can be characterized as "a matter of convenience" due to the existence of duplicate employer-provided facilities does not void the
conclusion that the expenditure is appropriate and helpful.3 '
Three dissenting opinions were voiced in Bodzin which implied
that home office deductions should not be allowed the liberal treatment given by the majority. Judge Scott disagreed with the majority, stating that he did not believe that the intent of section 162 was
to transform the personal expenses of maintaining a home into a
business expense merely because the taxpayer was sufficiently interested in his work to bring it home with him.3 5 This, he implied,
would give an individual too much freedom to change a personal
expense into a business expense. Judges Featherston and Quealy
would deny a deduction if it was shown that the taxpayer would
have rented the same apartment regardless of an intent to use a
36
portion of it as an office.
30. Id. at 822.
31. Id.
32. Id.at 825-26.
33. Id. at 825.
34. Id. at 825-26 (citations and footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 827.
36. Id. at 828, 829. Both Judge Featherston and Judge Quealy analogized Bodzin's expenditure to that in Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973), where the Supreme Court
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The nominal deduction allowed in Bodzin did not preclude the
Commissioner from seeking appellate review. 7 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the Tax Court." The Court
of Appeals held that, as a factual matter, the expense of renting the
apartment was a personal expense within the meaning of section 262
and not a business expense. Because Bodzin did not use any part
of his apartment as his place of business, it was unnecessary to
decide whether the expense was appropriate and helpful in carrying
on the taxpayer's business.39 However, the court suggested that an
employee would be allowed a deduction if he could demonstrate
that the employer's office was not available at the times the employee used the office in his residence or that the employer's office
was not suitable for the purposes for which the taxpayer used his
40
home office.
The respective positions of the Service and courts on home office
deductions provided an abundance of potential pitfalls for the taxpayer seeking to claim this deduction. The interim period between
the Tax Court's decision in Bodzin and the Fourth Circuit's reversal
in 1975 was characterized by diverse judicial decisions in this area.4
Recall, however, that Revenue Ruling 62-180 was significant not
only in that it dealt with the deductibility of expenses related to
business use of the home, but also for its consideration of the proper
allocation of expenses related to the home office. As the following
in a per curiam opinion disallowed a business expense deduction for a portion of the expense
of transporting a pilot's luggage in his automobile which would have been used in any event.
For subsequent application of this theory, see Merrill Lee Meeman, 66 T.C. 794 (1976).
37. The Tax Court allowed the Bodzins in computing their taxable income, to deduct $100
of the $2,100 annual rent which they paid for the apartment. 60 T.C. at 824, 826.
38. Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
Subsequently the Tax Court repudiated its holding in Bodzin. Sharon v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 515, 522-25 (1976).
39. 509 F.2d at 681.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., George W. Gino, 60 T.C. 304 (1973), rev'd, 538 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976) (deductibility of home office expense was not contested by the
Commissioner, just the formula used to calculate the amount of the deduction); George
Durgom, 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 259 (1974) (depreciation allowed for home projection room used
by agent to screen and publicize clients' films); Jay R. Gill, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 9 (1975) (the
court stated that the home office need only be "appropriate and helpful"); accord, Hall v.
United States, 387 F. Supp. 612 (D.N.H. 1975). Compare John T. Steen, 61 T.C. 298 (1973),
aff'd, 508 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1975) (the court disallowed a home office deduction for maintaining a building on a cattle ranch which was used for organizational meetings); Helen Kellner,
45 T.C.M. (P-H) 320 (1976) (the taxpayer was disallowed a deduction for failing to set aside
a portion of her residence for business use); Charles Edward Shepherd, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 215
(1976), (the court said occasional use of a table in the living room in connection with the
taxpayer's business amounted to merely incidental use motivated by considerations of personal convenience).

1978]

HOME OFFICE DEDUCTIONS

material will demonstrate, this issue alone was a source of substantial litigation.
COMPUTING THE DEDUCTION BEFORE NEW SECTION

280A

Revenue Ruling 62-180 allowed a pro rata deduction to qualifying
taxpayers for such deductible items as utilities, insurance, and depreciation allocable to the space occupied by the home office. Moreover, if the taxpayer was an apartment dweller or otherwise rented
his home, a deduction was allowed for part of the rent.
Revenue Ruling 62-180 did not, however, prescribe a specific
method of allocating the deductible expenses attributable to the
business use of the home. Normally, it would be proper to compare
the number of rooms or total square feet devoted to business use
to the total number of rooms or square feet in the home and apply
that ratio to the total household expenses for utilities, maintenance,
etc.42 The result would be the amount properly attributable to the
portion of the residence used for business purposes. A further allocation was mandated if the portion of the residence was not exclusively used for business purposes. This formula was commonly referred to as the "time-use" allocation, which meant that the allocation was derived by computing the ratio of the time the area was
actually used for business purposes to the total time it was available
for all uses.43
The Service's position in this regard was illustrated in George W.
Gino," a case involving a husband and wife who regularly used their
residence approximately two hours per night preparing for their
classes the following day. They also used the same area for personal
use six hours per day. The Commissioner contended that under
Revenue Ruling 62-180, the proper formula for computing the allocation was the number of hours per day the office was actually used
for business purposes divided by the total number of hours the room
was available for such use (i.e., twenty-four hours per day).45 The
Tax Court rejected this formula and held that the proper allocation
ratio is the ratio of hours of business use to total hours of use. It
concluded that 2/8 was a more reasonable ratio to apply than the
42. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 146 (1976); STAFF OF JOINT COMmiTrEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 138 (1976), reprinted in [2] 1976-3 C.B. 150
[hereinafter JT. COMM. EXPLANATION].
43. See Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. at 54.
44. 60 T.C. 304 (1973), rev'd, 538 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
45. 60 T.C. at 312-13.
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2/24 fraction employed by the Service. In so doing, the court, in
effect, refused to follow Revenue Ruling 62-180.11
Gino illustrated the Commissioner's persistent attitude in prescribing all the necessary rules and regulations for enforcement of
the Internal Revenue Code. His approach in Gino was surprising in
light of an earlier decision by the Tax Court dealing with precisely
the same issue of proper allocation.47 His time and effort was well
spent however, for late in 1976 the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court's decision in Gino.4s In a per curiam opinion the court of
appeals held that the Commissioner's method of computing the
allocable office-in-home expense was the correct formula to be used.
Thus, the proper computation required dividing the number of
hours per day of actual business use of the room by the twenty-four
hours per day during which the room is available for all uses.'
Implicit in the Gino appellate decision was a sense of futility and
frustration over the inconsistent approaches taken by the courts and
the Service in the home office area. The court of appeals recognized
the limitations imposed on the judicial branch when acting as a lawmaking body and chastised the Tax Court for its indifference to
guidelines published for the purpose of effective tax administration. 0
THE NEW SECTION

280A OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

The Tax Reform Act of 1976 adds to the Code new section 280A,
applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975.11
46. Id. at 314-15.
47. See International Artist, Ltd., 55 T.C. 94 (1970), acq. [1972] FED. TAXES (P-H)
54,717. In that case, the corporation purchased a house (3 stories and 28 rooms) to be used
as a studio and home office by the entertainer Liberace. Four rooms of the house were leased
by the corporation to Liberace to be used for his needs and to provide a home consistent with
his lifestyle. The Service concluded that maximum business use of the house was no more
than one-sixth of the total area and reduced the claimed deduction accordingly. 55 T.C. at
105. The Service arrived at the 20 percent figure by comparing the days of business use with
the total number of days available for both business and personal use. Id. and 107. The Tax
Court disagreed and allowed a 50 per cent allocation to business use on the grounds that the
actual business use of the home was far more extensive than the Service's determination. In
so doing, the court held that the proper method for allocating between business use and
personal use of a home was to determine the ratio of the time the premises were used for
business purposes to the total actual use of the premises. Id. at 107-08. Thus, the application
of this formula resulted in a substantially higher business deduction which was denied in
earlier cases concerning the same issue. Compare Martha E. Henderson, 37 T.C.M. (P-H)
130 (1968) with Joseph J. Imhoff, 39 T.C.M. (P-H) 1056 (1970).
48. 538 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
49. Id. at 834-35.
50. Id. at 835.
51. I.R.C. § 280A, as promulgated by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 601 (effective for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975).
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Section 280A provides that no deductions will be allowed for the
office use of a portion of a taxpayer's residence unless the taxpayer
falls within specific exceptions to the general rule of disallowance.
The provisions of section 280A apply to individuals, trusts, estates,
partnerships, and electing small business corporations. The section
does not, however, apply to corporations (other than electing small
business corporations).52
Section 280A will deny many taxpayers a deduction for maintaining a home office. The provisions of 280A are strict, and taxpayers
will no longer be afforded the luxury of judicial discretion characteristic of the formative years between 1962 and 1976.
Beginning with the basic premise that no deductions are allowed53
for expenses directly attributable to the personal use of a dwelling,
section 280A carves out narrow exceptions which, if met by the
taxpayer, will permit him to deduct an allocable portion of the
expenses incurred for business use of the home. Specifically, a taxpayer must show that the portion of the home maintained for busi5
ness purposes is used exclusively and on a regular basis (A) as the taxpayer's principal place of business,
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or
customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal
course of his trade or business, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to
the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business. 55
A fourth exception is included for the taxpayer who uses part of his
residence for storing inventory held for use in the taxpayer's trade
or business, but only if the dwelling unit is the sole fixed location
of such trade or business. 5 This latter provision applies even though
the "exclusive use" test is not met. On the other hand, an additional
requirement is mandated if the taxpayer happens to be an employee. To qualify he must demonstrate that the exclusive use of the
home office is on a regular basis and that it is for the convenience
of the employer.57
A final exception was created by Congress in 1977. Realizing that
the "exclusive use" test would rarely be met by taxpayers who pro52. I.R.C. § 280A(a).
53. Id.
54. Id. §280A(c)(1).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 280A(c)(2).
57. Id. § 280A(c)(1).
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vide certain day care services in their homes,5 8 Congress amended
section 280A to include an exception from the general disallowance
rule and the exclusive use test. Section 280A now permits a deduction for expenses allocable to any portion of a residence used for the
trade or business of providing day care for children, for individuals
who have attained age 65, or for individuals who are physically or
mentally incapable of caring for themselves.5 9 The amendment does
retain, however, the "regular basis" test. Moreover, the deduction
is allowed only if the owner or operator of the trade or business has
applied for, has been granted, or is exempt from having a license,
certification, registration, or approval as a day care facility under
the provision of any applicable state law. 0
Graphically illustrated, the requirements of section 280A appear
as follows:
USE

Principal
Place of
Business

Storage
of
Inventory

In ConnecMeet
tion with
Patients, Taxpayer's
Clients, or Trade or
Customers Business

Day
Care
Services

Employee

REQUIREMENT
Exclusive
Use

X

"X

X

X

Regular

Basis
Dwelling Is
Sole Location of
Trade or

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Business
Separate
Structure
Convenience
of Employer

X
X

The "exclusive use" requirement appears to be the most restrictive provision of the new section. Its effect is to deny a deduction if
a portion of the residence is used for both personal purposes and for
the carrying on of a trade or business. The issue will undoubtedly
58. S. Rep. No. 95-66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 89, 91 (1977).
59. Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 406, 91 Stat. 126
(amending I.R.C. § 280A(c)(4), effective for taxable years after December 31, 1975).
60. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(4)(B).
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arise as to what activity constitutes "personal purposes." If the
home office consists of a den used by an attorney who writes legal
briefs, prepares tax returns, or engages in similar activities as well
as personal purposes, he will be denied a deduction for the expenses
paid or incurred in connection with the use of the residence which
are allocable to these activities." Similarly, in the case of a separate
structure such as a detached garage used by an artist in connection
with his trade or business, if it is used for both business and personal
purposes, the deduction will be denied. 2 However, note that this
latter provision (e.g., separate structure) does not mandate the requirement that the office be the taxpayer's principal place of business-just that it be used exclusively and regularly in connection
with his trade or business.
We have already seen how the use of a room at different times for
both business and personal purposes will effectively deny a deduction under 280A. What is not clear, however, is the status of a room
part of which is regularly used for business and another portion of
which is regularly used for personal purposes. To further complicate
matters, suppose the room is partitioned by a divider. Under these
circumstances, it appears that even the most liberal interpretation
of the "exclusive use" requirement may not work to the advantage
of the taxpayer. Moreover, under the "regular basis" test it is no
longer possible to obtain a home office deduction if the taxpayer's
use of the office is merely incidental or occasional even though he
uses it exclusively for the conduct of that trade or business.
As noted above, one of the exceptions to the disallowance provision of section 280A is exclusive and regular use of a portion of the
home used as the taxpayer's principal place of business. Since neither the law nor the committee reports explain the meaning of
"principal place of business," a taxpayer engaged in two businesses
is likely to find himself in the precarious position of having the
Service decide which business is primary and which is secondary.
The elements which the Service may consider include the continuity
and regularity of the business activity, coupled with the presence of
a profit motive. 3 Thus, suppose a taxpayer owns property which is
rented to tenants and in addition, maintains an active law practice.
The deductions for home office expenses incurred in the real prop61. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 148 (1976); JT. COMM. EXPLANATON, supra note 42, at 140, reprinted in [2] 1976-3
C.B. at 152.
62. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1976).
63. H.R. RaP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1975), S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 148-49 (1976).
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erty business are likely to be disallowed since the trade or business
of providing legal services indicates the primary source of livelihood. 4 Even if the taxpayer in this example can convince the Service that his home real estate office is a principal place of business,
the Service is apt to disallow the deduction on the grounds that the
home office was not used on a "regular basis."
The home office can also qualify under 280A if used exclusively
and on a regular basis as a place of business which is used by
patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business. Neither the
statute nor the committee reports clarify this provision. Inherent
ambiguities include the meaning of terms such as "regular basis,"
"normal course of trade or business," and "clients." What consideration, for example, is to be given to the businessman who simply
does not associate with clients, patients, or customers? Presumably,
his deduction will be disallowed, although in such a situation the
taxpayer may attempt to qualify under the "principal place of business" exception.
If the taxpayer happens to be an employee, not only must he
qualify his home office under one of the above mentioned exceptions, but he must also hurdle the "convenience of the employer"
requirement: the home office must be used and maintained for the
convenience of the employer. The committee reports state that the
old "appropriate and helpful" test will no longer be applied since
in many situations applying this test resulted in treating personal
living and family expenses, directly attributable to the home, as
ordinary and necessary business deductions even though these expenses may not have resulted in additional or incremental costs.6
The committee reports, however, do not adequately explain the
meaning of the phrase "convenience of the employer." But the
identical language can be found in other sections of the Code, particularly section 119 dealing with the gross income exclusion of
meals and lodging furnished to the employee for the convenience of
64. See, e.g., Joseph M. Philbin, 26 T.C. 1159 (1956), where under similar facts, the Tax
Court found that the real estate purchases by the taxpayer were not infrequent and sporadic
but were continuous and substantial throughout the taxable years in question. Furthermore,
the net profit from the sale of the realty in those years totaled approximately $93,000.00,
compared to a total of $20,000.00 derived from the practice of law. Accordingly, the court
found that the above activity was sufficient to deem it a trade or business and taxed the gains
as ordinary income rather than capital gains.
65. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B).
66. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1975); S. REP. No.94-938, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 147 (1976); JT. COMM. EXPLANATION, supra note 42, at 139, reprinted in [2] 1976-3
C.B. at 151.
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the employer. The Treasury Regulations for section 119 attempt to
define this phrase, stating that the convenience of the employer test
is met if the item provided to the employee is for substantial noncompensatory business reasons of the employer.67
The new law provides an exception to the strict "exclusive use"
requirement in the case of a taxpayer whose trade or business is
selling products at the retail or wholesale level and whose home is
the sole fixed location of such trade or business. If the taxpayer uses
part of the dwelling unit for storing inventory, then an allocable
portion of the expenses attributable to the storage area are deductible. 8 Care should be exercised, however, to assure that the space is
used regularly and is maintained as a separate and identifiable
space suitable for storage.
The 1977 amendment also provides relief to day care operators
from the stringent "exclusive use" requirement. Those taxpayers in
the trade or business or providing day care services in their residence do not have to use a portion of their home exclusively for that
service, but must do so on a regular basis. In addition, certain licensing requirements must be complied with prior to allowance of
the allocable expenses.
The Committee Report noted that the portion of a residence used
for day care facilities would also be used for personal purposes, but
that this fact alone should not disqualify a taxpayer from the deduction permitted under 280A.19 A day care business would ordinarily
result in higher expenses for the taxpayer: additional wear and tear
on the residence, additional repair and maintenance, and additional
utilities costs.70 Congress believed that these incremental expenses,
which are beyond those attributable to the personal use of the residence, sufficiently justified a deduction even though a portion of the
home was used for both business and personal purposes.
COMPUTING THE ALLOWABLE DEDUCTION UNDER SECTION

280A

If the claimed home office deductions are permissible under the
provisions of section 280A, the question then becomes one of proper
allocation of the attributable expenses. Section 280A further restricts the appeal of home office deductions by placing an overall
limitation on the amount of deductions a taxpayer may take for
maintaining an office in his dwelling. Basically, the deduction al67.
68.
69.
70.

Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42.
I.R.C. § 280A(c)(2).
S. REP. No. 95-66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 89, 91 (1977).
Id.

[Vol. 6:129

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

144

lowed cannot exceed the amount of gross income derived from business use of the home office reduced by the allocable deductions
which are allowed without regard to their connection with the taxpayer's trade or business (i.e., interest, taxes, and casualty losses).71
As the examples given below illustrate, the allowable deduction is
derived by first determining the total amount of gross income derived from the use of the office for the taxable year in question; from
this amount subtract an allocable portion of the interest, taxes and
casualty losses expended during the year for the entire dwelling
unit. The remainder is then reduced by the allowable deductions
that are allocable to business use.
Presumably, taxpayers will be allowed to determine the deductible amount attributable to business use of the home by any reasonable means of allocation depending, of course, on the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. Furthermore, there is no reason
to believe that the previous methods of allocation employed under
Revenue Ruling 62-180 are no longer available. The formula can be
expressed as a ratio of the total square footage of the portion of the
residence used in the trade or business divided by the total square
footage of the home. The figure thus derived will be multiplied as a
percentage against the total allowable deductions (e.g., utilities,
insurance, depreciation and/or rent). Note that the old "time-use"
test which often was juxtaposed to the "space-use" test has been
eliminated here because the exclusive use requirement of section
280A.
To illustrate the foregoing, assume the following:
Employee X uses a room in his home exclusively and on a regular
basis as his principal place of business. It is further shown that X
maintains the room for the convenience of his employer. X derives
$10,000 gross income from the business use of his room in 1977. He
pays $1,500 in interest and taxes on his home, and the remaining
expenses (depreciation, utility, insurance and maintenance) total
$2,500. If the size of the room is approximately one-fourth (or 25%)
of the total size of the house, X would compute his deduction as
follows:
Gross business income derived
$10,000.00
Allocable portion of interest
-

and taxes (25% of $1,500)

Overall limitation on business expenses
Allocable portion of depreciation, etc.
(25% of $2,500)
71.

I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5).

375.00

$ 9,625.00
$

625.00
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Since the $625 of expenses attributable to the home office does not
exceed the limitation of $9,625, X can deduct $625 on his tax return.7"
On the other hand, consider the plight of Y Assume the following
facts exist:
Y, a self-employed retailer of Widgets, uses his garage to store his
inventory. Y does not have any other location to conduct his business other than the garage set aside in his home. Y makes $3,000
gross business income in 1977. He pays $7,000 in interest and taxes
on his residence and $4,000 in maintenance, utility, depreciation
and insurance expenses. The square footage of the garage compared to the total dwelling unit is approximately 30%. His business
deduction for his home office is as follows:
Gross business income derived
$3,000.00
Allocable portion of interest and taxes
(30% of $7,000)
Overall limitation on business expenses
Allocable portion of maintenance, etc.
expenses (30% of $4,000)

-

2,100.00
$

900.00

$1,200.00

Since the $1,200 business expense attributable to the home office
exceeds the overall limitation by $300, Y will only be able to deduct
$900 on his tax return.
Special allocation rules apply for a taxpayer seeking a deduction
for maintaining a day care facility in his residence.7 3 Similar to
existing law prior to the enactment of section 280A,74 an allocation
of expenses is first made on the basis of space in the residence used
for the day care facility. That is, the expenses attributable to the
portion of the residence used for business purposes would be determined on the basis of floor space devoted to business use compared
to the total floor space of the residence. Then, the expenses allocable
to the space used for business purposes would be subject to the
72. It should be pointed out that the Joint Committee Explanation to Section 280A, omits
the word "allocable" from its discussion of the permissible deductions. Although this apparently is due to draftmanship oversight, evidenced by the appearance of the word in the Senate
Committee Reports and in the language of the Code itself, the omission could conceivably
pose problems. For example, in the case of taxpayer X, the $1,500 expenses incurred for
interest and taxes on the home would be subtracted in its entirety from the gross business
income figure. This produces a smaller overall limitation figure on business expenses-a
result which further restricts the appeal of § 280A.
73. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(4)(C).
74. See Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52.
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special allocation rule based on the actual time the area was used
for business purposes. Thus, the amount deductible is determined
by multiplying the expenses allocable on the basis of space by a
fraction-the numerator is the number of hours the area is used for
business purposes and the denominator is the 24 hours per day the
area is available for all uses.
For example, assume that taxpayer Z maintains a day care facility in a portion of his residence which physically represents an area
equal to one-fifth (1/5) of the entire home. The area is used for day
care services daily for five hours. The formula would appear as
follows: 5/24 x 1/5 = 1/24. Thus, if Z's rent and utility bills are $240
per month, a deduction of $10 per month is all that is allowed. It
should also be noted that the overall limitation on deductions outlined above in the case of Y is also applicable. 5 However, for all
practical purposes this limitation will seldom, if ever, be reached
because the time-use formula severely restricts the amount of an
allowable deduction.
THE RAMIFICATIONS OF SECTION 280A

One of the more conspicuous features of the new law is its treatment of so-called Higgins-type taxpayers. Expenses paid or incurred
with respect to the use of a residence by the taxpayer both as a home
and in connection with income producing activities" will not be
allowable deductions under section 280A unless the income producing activity constitutes a trade or business. For example, no home
office deduction will be allowed to the investor who is not in the
trade or business of making investments even though he uses his den
exclusively and on a regular basis to read the financial reports contained in various periodicals." Although this taxpayer may realize
substantial income from investment decisions made as a result of
his studies in the home office, the activity is not deemed sufficient
to satisfy the trade or business requirement.
This result is of particular significance if one considers past congressional action. In 1975, Congress amended the Code to extend the
deductions allowable by section 162 of the Code to taxpayers engaged in profit-seeking activities.7 This legislative intent is re75. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5).
76. See I.R.C. § 212.
77. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 149 (1976), JT. COMM. EXPLANATION, supra note 42, at 140, reprinted in [2] 1976-3
C.B. at 152.
78. Act of March 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 208(c), 89 Stat. 26 (1975).
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flected in section 212 of the Code, the effect of which is to remove
the "trade or business" feature from the "ordinary and necessary"
requirement of section 162. Thus, a taxpayer engaged in a profitseeking activity which was not a trade or business could still deduct
the expenses attributable to his profit-seeking activity. The new
section 280A, however, does not permit a home office deduction to
this "special" class of taxpayer. In light of the 1975 action, the scope
of section 280A seems unnecessarily restrictive.
Another obvious effect of the new section 280A is the resurrection
of the old "convenience of the employer" requirement, reminiscent
of the Service's position in the past. The construction of this provision effectively destroys the old "appropriate and helpful" test and
at the same time breathes new life into the "condition of employment" requirement previously enunciated in Revenue Ruling 62180.
Section 280A does not apply to corporations. Arguably, this could
encourage innovative taxpayers to buy their home under the guise
of a corporate entity and then enter into a lease agreement whereby
the "corporation" leases the home back to them. A carefully constructed lease which clearly allocated the portions of the home to
be used for business and personal purposes may work to circumvent
section 280A for a taxpayer unable to meet its requirements by
himself. However, one should be extremely careful in this area, for
it is not unusual for the Service to characterize such arrangements
as receipt of constructive dividends arising from personal use of
79
corporate property.
Finally, it should be noted that section 280A does not affect deductions ordinarily permitted without regard to their connection
with the taxpayer's trade or business or with his income-producing
activity." Thus, taxpayers can still deduct items such as mortgage
interest, taxes and casualty losses without regard to section 280A.
Furthermore, nothing in 280A prohibits depreciating tangible personal property contained in the home office, such as typewriters,
business machines and office furniture.
CONCLUSION

The policy of section 262 of the Code, which denies deductions for
personal expenses, was clearly a motivating force behind the new
section 280A. Courts had become entangled in the controversy surrounding the mixture of personal and business use of a residence
79.
80.

See, e.g., International Artists Ltd., 55 T.C. 94 (1970).
I.R.C. § 280A(b).
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and a clear need for congressional guidance existed. Congress' response will unquestionably alleviate the burden on the Service and
the courts. The cost is high from the individual taxpayer's viewpoint. Nevertheless, a weighing of all the facts surrounding home
offices reveals the need for tighter controls in this area. Even if one
accepts this premise, that fact does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that section 280A will alleviate the existing conflict in the
home office arena. But if equitable tax administration for all taxpayers remains the primary goal of the Service and the judiciary,
stricter guidelines may be the only solution.

